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Danae Azaria’s article is a perfect example of a specific genre of international
law scholarship: an ‘orthodox’ account that wishes to stay neatly within the lines
that legal doctrine draws between ‘legal’ and ‘extra-legal’ considerations. This
contribution is critical not so much of Azaria’s article as such but of the genre of
international law writing it represents.
Azaria’s article contains two central propositions. The first is descriptive and says
that the International Law Commission (ILC) has been engaging in a practice
she calls ‘codification by interpretation’. The second is normative and consists in
asserting that this practice should be embraced as it contributes to the legitimacy
of international law as a whole. Azaria refers mainly to the projects concerning
the interpretation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
This focus on the interpretation of the VCLT itself is crucial for the core of Azaria’s
argument on the contribution of the ILC’s interpretative practice to international law’s
legitimacy. Azaria argues that this practice reaffirms and clarifies the secondary
rules contained in the VCLT, thereby exerting a sustained influence on how to
create, apply, and terminate international treaties containing primary rules across all
international legal fields. This, in her account, “has the potential to instil international
law with continued legitimacy” (at p. 172).
Interpretation, international law, and legal positivism: an uneasy relationship
Basing the interpretation of rules on rules of interpretation necessarily leads to
problems of self-referentiality. Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems have shown
that formal systems that use one language to describe meta-questions about that
same language can never be both consistent and complete. Therefore, even if it
were possible to eliminate all the muddiness of every-day natural language and of
legal argument, precise predictability of interpretive outcomes would always remain
an unattainable goal. Azaria’s article does not entirely neglect the problems arising
from self-referentiality. As a way out of the ‘infinite regress’, she chooses to follow
the ‘rules perception’ of the actors who ‘use’ the VCLT (at p. 175). Azaria argues
that these actors base their practice “on the assumption that there is one correct
interpretation and that this meaning has to be found” (at p. 176). In choosing to
place her article within this paradigm, she explicitly states that her article “does
not deal with the philosophical, social, political or other aspects of interpretation”.
Instead of dealing with these ‘external’ aspects, her article engages in “a positive law
analysis” (at p. 176).
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Engaging with Azaria’s article on its own terms, there is at least one simply
unavoidable philosophical question: How does her ‘positive law analysis’ fit into
legal positivism? Specifically, if she claims to engage in a positive law analysis,
how does the assumption she ascribes to interpreting agents in international legal
practice – namely that they are in the business of finding one correct interpretation of
a legal rule – fit into philosophical accounts of legal positivism? This question points
towards an uneasy relationship between international lawyers who call themselves
‘positivists’ on the one hand and legal positivism as a philosophical school of thought
on the other hand. The legal philosophers who have shaped legal positivism have
done so by emphatically rejecting the idea that there is one correct interpretation
of a legal text. In the famous so-called ‘Hart-Dworkin Debate’, it was the positivist
side that rejected Ronald Dworkin’s thesis that there is one right answer to legal
questions, which can be found by way of interpretation. Similarly, Hans Kelsen
insisted that the process of deriving the content of a legal norm in question from a
higher-ranking norm can only provide a frame of appropriate interpretative decisions
and that within this frame, the interpreting organ enjoys discretion to create a new
norm (Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre at p. 90-91).
Azaria’s article is not informed by positivism as legal philosophy. By claiming that
her article engages in a positive law analysis, Azaria is probably not referring to
positivism as a philosophical current but subscribing to a school of thought of
international lawyers who call themselves ‘positivists’ but whose approach Jörg
Kammerhofer has more aptly labelled ‘orthodox’. Two aspects of Azaria’s account
characterise it as orthodox: First, she takes the general assumptions she attributes
to the majority of relevant practitioners as the unquestioned starting point of her
analysis. Second, she claims not to need a philosophical, social, political or other
kind of theoretical substratum for her doctrinal claims. However, doctrinal positions
necessarily have an underlying theory. Rejecting to engage with the theoretical
underpinnings of a doctrinal argument therefore leads to unconsciously adopting
a theoretical position. Because it is not deliberately adopted based on theoretical
reflection, this theoretical position will often turn out to be inconsistent.
Legitimacy through predictability: Convincing states to use international law?
Even when engaging in doctrinal work, international legal scholars cannot avoid
taking a stance on theoretical questions. In this vein, Jan Klabbers criticised Azaria’s
and two other articles in the same issue of the European Journal of International
Law for seeming “to operate in a political vacuum, presupposing that the making
of international law can be reduced to a technical exercise, informed at best by
analytical-philosophical considerations but without any concern for political concepts
such as legitimation, democracy, representation or accountability” (Klabbers at
p. 270). Azaria does indeed try to place her analysis in a political and theoretical
vacuum. It is important to note, however, that she does engage with questions of
legitimacy. After all, her argument is not merely that the ILC engages in ‘codification
by interpretation’, but that this development should be welcomed, because it
provides legitimacy to international law as a whole.
Azaria mentions the developments in international law in the 1990s and 2000s that
gave rise to the ‘fragmentation debate’, i.e. the increased number of multilateral
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conventions and adjudicative bodies (at p. 198). She argues that the danger of
decreased clarity and predictability of international law and an ensuing weakened
confidence in international law “is pressing today given that some states seem keen
to disengage from multilateral treaties (and international adjudication)” (at p. 199).
In Azaria’s account, the ILC can remedy this through its practice of ‘codification by
interpretation’. She argues that by reaffirming and clarifying the secondary rules
contained in the VCLT, the ILC can increase the predictability of international law as
a whole and thereby convince states to continue to use international law to regulate
their conduct (at p. 199).
It is common among international legal scholars to claim that increased clarity and
predictability of rules creates a ‘normative pull’, i.e. that increased predictability
convinces states to comply with international legal rules. The claim is essentially
an empirical claim for which only limited empirical evidence exists. The thesis
may have been  plausible to some degree in the 1990s – when Thomas Franck
articulated its most detailed theoretical variant and when Abram Chayes and
Antonia Handler Chayes found in their managerial account of compliance that
unintentional (!) violations of treaty obligations are often partly caused by ambiguous
and indeterminate treaty language. However, it is hard to imagine that the Donald
Trumps, Jair Bolsonaros, and Rodrigo Dutertes of our current world would be more
inclined to adhere to international treaties just because the ILC has clarified the
VCLT rules for them.
International law doctrine and critical international law
In passing, Azaria (at p. 172) mentions David Kennedy’s observation that
interpretation operates as the functional equivalent of truth. She quotes Jan
Klabbers who concludes from the same Kennedy piece that “whoever controls
the process of interpretation, therewith controls the truth” (Klabbers at p. 20).
Kennedy’s observation was part of a critique of power and ideology in how legal
meaning is created. Klabbers took this as a starting point for his argument that
international lawyers should focus on virtue ethics in their accounts of interpretation,
given that the interpreting agents are ultimately personally responsible for their
interpretative decisions. In the context of Azaria’s argument, Kennedy’s and
Klabbers’ statements acquire a new meaning. Here, the observation that whoever
controls the interpretation process therewith controls the truth sounds like a rallying
cry directed at fellow international lawyers committed to the project of liberal
internationalism.
Doubling down on both formalism and managerialism will not stop the rise of far-
right and openly fascist movements. Martti Koskenniemi’s thesis that the ‘backlash’
against liberal internationalism is mainly fuelled by opposition to liberal claims of
expertise may not convey the whole story. Anne Orford suggests focusing on the
economic aspects of liberal internationalism instead. Similarly, Ntina Tzouvala
argues in her recent monograph that “any effort to counter the rise of the far-right
without questioning authoritarian neoliberal capitalism will always yield precarious
gains” (at p. 19). Rose Parfitt invites us to look more closely at the history of
international law and fascism to understand how fascism, paradoxically, has
become a truly global phenomenon, to understand what makes the boomerang of
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colonialism, which returned to Europe in the form of fascism, yet again boomerang
to the Global South. In any case, things do not exactly seem to be going in the right
direction and ‘keep calm and carry on’ may not be the best response.
By way of conclusion
The point of this contribution is not to convince ‘orthodox generalist’ international
lawyers to abandon doctrine altogether and engage in critical legal scholarship
instead (although I would be curious to see what kind of world this would bring about
and suspect that it would be a slightly better one). The more moderate suggestion
is that all international legal scholars should take note of critical legal scholarship,
that they should reflect on the place of their scholarship with regard to the most
pressing concerns of our present world, and that they should do so in a theoretically
informed manner. Just like critical international law scholars cannot avoid engaging
with doctrine, doctrinal scholarship cannot avoid engaging with critique. As Marina
Veli#kovi# succinctly put it in a tweet last week:
“Some people treat critical scholarship (also feminist critiques, TWAIL,
marxism) as a topping that adds flavor, but which can be removed without
the meal losing any nutrition whereas actually these critiques are saying if
we keep eating the same thing we’ll all get scurvy”.
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